The new cyber attack pattern of advanced persistent threats (APTs) poses a serious threat to cyberspace. This paper addresses the issue of defending against APTs in a cost-effective way. First, the APT-based cyber attack-defense processes are modeled as a type of differential dynamical systems. Then, the cyber defense problem is modeled as an optimal control problem. The optimal control problem is shown to have an optimal control, and the optimality system for the problem is presented. Therefore, a cost-effective cyber defense strategy can be figured out by solving the optimality system. Finally, the influences of some factors, including the bounds on the admissible controls and the network topology, on the cost-effective defense strategies are examined. To our knowledge, this is the first time the APT-based cyber defense problem is treated this way.
Introduction
Cyberspace has become an integral part of our society. All the time, a great deal of data are collected, processed and stored on computers and are transmitted across networks to other computers [1, 2] . However, cyberspace is vulnerable to a wide range of cyber threats. Sophisticated cyber perpetrators exploit vulnerabilities to steal what they want or to disrupt essential cyber services. In light of the consequence of cyber attacks, strengthening the security and resilience of cyber networks has come to be an important mission of the cybersecurity community [3] [4] [5] .
Advanced persistent threats (APTs) are a new type of cyber attacks. With a clear goal, an APT attack is highly targeted, well-organized, well-resourced, covert and persistent [6] [7] [8] . APTs pose a severe threat to cyberspace, because they invalidate conventional cyber defense mechanisms. In recent years, the number of APTs has been increasing rapidly [9] . Therefore, it is imperative to develop cost-effective cyber defense strategies against APTs.
An APT to the cyber network is twofold: external attack and internal infection. The former is conducted by the external attacker, with the intent of compromising the secure hosts in the network. The attack strength to secure host i is a i . We refer to the vector a = (a 1 , · · · , a N ) as a attack strategy. The latter is led by the compromised hosts in the network, with the intent of compromising the secure hosts in the network. The expected infection strength to secure host i at time t is β N j=1 a i j C j (t), where β > 0 is referred to as the infection force. A defense of the cyber network is also twofold: prevention and recovery. The former is dedicated to preventing the secure nodes in the network from being compromised. The prevention strenght of secure node i at time t is x i (t). We refer to the vector-valued function x(t) = (x 1 (t), · · · , x N (t)) as a prevention strategy. The latter is devoted to recovering the compromised nodes in the network. The recovery strenght of compromised host i at time t is y i (t). We refer to the vector-valued function y(t) = (y 1 (t), · · · , y N (t)) as a recovery strategy. Furthermore, we refer to the vector-valued function u(t) = (x(t), y(t)) = (x 1 (t), · · · , x N (t), y 1 (t), · · · , y N (t)) as a defense strategy.
Next, let us impose a set of hypotheses as follows.
(H 1 ) Due to external attack, at time t secure node i gets compromised at rate a i x i (t) . This hypothesis is rational, because the rate is proportional to the attack strength and is inversely proportional to the prevention strength.
(H 2 ) Due to internal infection, at time t secure node i gets compromised at the expected rate
. This assumption is rational, because the expected rate is proportional to the expected infection strength and is inversely proportional to the prevention strength.
(H 3 ) Due to recovery, at time t compromised node i becomes secure at rate y i (t). This assumption is rational, because the rate is proportional to the recovery strength.
Based on the above hypotheses, an APT-based cyber attack/defense process can be modeled as the following dynamical system.
We refer to the model as the individual-level secure-compromised-secure (SCS) model. The diagram of state transitions of a host under this model is shown in Fig. 1 . The individual-level SCS model can be rewritten in matrix notation as
The modeling of the cyber defense problem
The defender's goal is to find a cost-effective cyber defense strategy, i.e. a defense strategy that minimizes the loss caused by the APT at a lower cost. The goal of this section is to model the cyber defense problem.
Suppose the cyber defense starts at time t = 0 and terminates at time t = T , and the admissible set of the cyber defense strategies is
Define the influence of host i in the cyber network as its degree in the network.
Intuitively, the more influential a host, the more serious the consequence of compromising it will be [35, 36] . Hence, the expected loss caused by the APT in the time interval [0, T ] is estimated as
On the other hand, the costs for the prevention strategy x and the recovery strategy y in the time interval [0, T ] are estimated as
and
respectively. So, the cost for the defense strategy u in the time interval [0, T ] is estimated as
Therefore, the expected cost effectiveness of the defense strategy u in the time interval [0, T ] can be estimated as
where
On this basis, the cyber defense problem can be modeled as the following optimal control problem.
And an optimal control for the problem (P) represents a cost-effective defense strategy.
A theoretical analysis of the optimal control problem
This section is devoted to theoretically studying the optimal control problem (P). For fundamental knowledge on optimal control theory, see Refs. [29, 30] .
The existence of an optimal control
As an optimal control for the problem (P) represents a cost-effective defense strategy, it is critical to show that the problem (P) has an optimal control. The following lemma comes from Ref. [30] .
Lemma 1. Problem (P) has an optimal control if the following five conditions hold simultaneously.
(C 1 ) U is closed and covex.
(C 2 ) There is u ∈ U such that the adjunctive dynamical system is solvable.
Next, let us show that the five conditions in Lemma 1 indeed hold.
. Hence, the claim follows from the observation that
. So, the claim follows from the observation that
Lemma 4. There is u ∈ U such that the associated adjunctive dynamical system is solvable.
Proof: Consider the adjunctive dynamical system
where u(t) ≡ u = (x, · · · , x, y, · · · , y) T . As F(C, u) is continuously differentiable, the claim follows from the Continuation Theorem for Differential Systems [34] . Proof: The claim follows the observation that for t ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, · · · , N, (2) .
We are ready to present the main result of this subsection. This theorem guarantees that there is a cost-effective cyber defense strategy against any APT.
The optimality system
It is known that the optimality system for an optimal control problem offers a method for numerically solving the problem. This subsection is intended to present the optimality system for the problem (P). For this purpose, consider the corresponding Hamiltonian
where λ = (λ 1 , · · · , λ N ) T is the adjoint.
Theorem 2. Suppose u * is an optimal control for the problem (P), C * is the solution to the adjunctive dynamical system with u = u * . Then, there exists λ * with λ * (T ) = 0 such that for 0 ≤ t ≤ T , 1 ≤ i ≤ N,
Proof: According to the Pontryagin Minimum Principle [29] , there exists λ * such that
Thus, the first N equations in the claim follow by direct calculations. As the terminal cost is unspecified and the final state is free, the transversality condition λ * (T ) = 0 holds. By using the optimality condition
we get (a) either ∂H(C * (t), u * (t), λ * (t))
Combining the above discussions, we get the optimality system for the problem (P) as follows.
Applying the forward-backward Euler scheme to the optimality system, we can obtain the optimal control to the problem (P), i.e, a cost-effective cyber defense strategy.
A simulation-based study of the optimal control problem
This section is devoted to studying the optimal control problem (P) by solving the optimality system (11).
Numerical examples of the optimal control
Given an admissible control u to the problem (P), define the overall control (OC) function as
the cumulative loss-cost (CLC) function as
This subsection gives three exemplar optimal control for the problem (P). synthetic scale-free network [37] with N = 100 nodes as the cyber network. The initial condition is C i (0) = 0.1, 0 ≤ i ≤ N. The optimal control for the problem is obtained by solving the optimality system (11) . The OC function and the CLC function are shown in Fig. 2(a) and Fig. 2(b) , respectively. For comparison purpose, we also present the OC functions and the CLC functions for a few admissible static controls in Fig. 2(a) and Fig. 2(b) , respectively. Example 2. Consider the problem (P) with T = 20, β = 0.001, x = y = 0.1, x = y = 0.7, a i = 0.1, 0 ≤ i ≤ N, and a synthetic small-world network [38] with N = 100 nodes as the cyber network. The initial condition is C i (0) = 0.1, 0 ≤ i ≤ N. The optimal control for the problem is obtained by solving the optimality system (11) . The OC function and the CLC function are shown in Fig. 3(a) and Fig. 3(b) , respectively. For comparison purpose, we also present the OC functions and the CLC functions for a few admissible static controls in Fig. 3(a) and Fig. 3(b) , respectively. and a realistic email network [39] as the cyber network. The initial condition is C i (0) = 0.1, 0 ≤ i ≤ N. The optimal control for the problem is obtained by solving the optimality system (11) . The OC function and the CLC function are shown in Fig. 4(a) and Fig. 4(b) , respectively. For comparison purpose, we also present the OC functions and the CLC functions for a few admissible static controls in Fig. 4(a) and Fig. 4(b) , respectively. It is concluded from the above three examples that the cost-effective cyber defense strategy corresponding to the optimal control for the problem (P) is significantly superior to the static cyber defense strategies corresponding to the static controls for the same problem in terms of the cost effectiveness. This justifies the cost-effective cyber defense strategies. Additionally, the OC function corresponding to the optimal control is decreasing rapidly.
The bounds on the admissible controls
The two upper bounds, x and y, and the two lower bounds, x and y, on the admissible controls have influence on the optimal control for the problem (P). The goal of this subsection is to understand the influence. Suppose u * is an optimal control for the problem (P). Let OL * denote the expected overall loss, OC * the overall cost, OJ * the sum of the two parts. The following conclusions are drawn from the above three examples.
(a) OL * goes down rapidly, and OC * and OJ * goes up rapidly, with the increase of x or y. In practice, x and y should be chosen so that a balance between the overall loss and the overall cost is achieved.
(b) The influences of x or y on OL * , OC * and OJ * are almost negligible.
The structure of the cyber network
This subsection addresses the influence of the structure of the network on the optimal control for the problem (P).
First, it is known that the heterogeneity of a scale-free network increases with the increase of the power-law exponent. It is concluded that OL * and OJ * declines, and OC * inclines, with the increase of the heterogeneity of the scale-free cyber network. In practice, cyber networks should be organized in a heterogeneous way.
Second, it is known that the randomness of a small-world network increases with the edge-rewiring probability. It is concluded that OL * , OC * and OJ * rise rapidly with the increase of the randomness of the small-world cyber network. This shows that a cyber network with less random connections is superior to a cyber network with more random connections in terms of the optimal APT-based cyber defense strategy. In practice, cyber networks should be organized in a less random way.
Concluding remarks
This paper has addressed the cost-effective defense of cyber networks under APTs. The cyber defense problem has been modeled as an optimal control problem, which has been studied theoretically. The influences of some factors on the cost-effective defense strategy have been examined.
The weighted balance between the loss and the cost seems a problem. In practice, the execution of the proposed defense strategies needs a great effort. As most realistic networks such as the social networks vary over time, this work should be generalized to the time-varying networks [40, 41] . It is of practical importance to study the cyber defense problem in a game-theoretical context, where the APT attack is strategic [42] [43] [44] .
